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Introduction
Scope of Inquiry
Exploration of reconstruction issues here will be narrowed to urban, post-conflict scenarios.
Extreme scenarios throw core issues into sharp relief. Violent inter-ethnic conflicts frequently
result in destruction of the iconic built environment because it is a place where emblematic and
psychologically potent associations can be exploited directly for purposes of widespread
psychological demoralization within the ranks of an enemy population.

Armed conflict will be treated as a type of disaster resulting from social phenomena differing
little in its physical impacts from disasters resulting from natural phenomena. The difference is
felt in the aftermath, when the strength and effectiveness of coping mechanisms vary greatly.
1
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Emphasis will be placed on the negative impacts of conflict in relation to social development and
how external intervention can optimally weaken them.

Disclaimer
A working paper of such brevity cannot illuminate more than a handful of ideas chosen from
among many that deserve careful consideration by practitioners with an interest in post-war
reconstruction. In no way does this document represent a condensation of the most important
and useful ideas in what is a large and growing scholarly domain. A handful of topics were
chosen in light of the special interests of the Center for Macro Projects and Diplomacy
(henceforth CMPD), the built environment professional, the student, and the community of
conscientious private investors—all persons concerned about the repetition of mistakes
observable in the wake of major humanitarian disasters and all capable of formulating
constructive, innovative responses.

Reliable longitudinal studies of post-war recovery processes are few, and the number of war-torn
sites not yet subjected to formal analysis is large. Scant academic literature is devoted to the postwar experience of communities in Asia, the Soviet Union, Greece, Spain after its Civil War, subSaharan Africa, or the Palestinian West Bank, to list only a few. Certainly the current inhabitants
of Iraq, Afghanistan, the Sudan and Chechnya would benefit from such research when fighting
ends in their cities and villages—if it existed and were accessible. Likewise, the residents of other
cities blighted by war would gain insight from the timely analysis of their experiences.

Up to the present there exists a chronic lack of research to facilitate change and improvement in
the post-conflict relief system; studies tend to be overly technical, segmented, and short term.
Results are rarely placed in a standard framework that would allow for translation from one
post-war scenario to another, as noted by Cuny and others.1

The cursory and somewhat arbitrary treatment of issues that follows is intended to foster debate
and illuminate promising avenues for future research rather than constitute a reliable index of
key concerns. It is a prompt, not a catalog. It is also aimed at practical rather than scholarly
goals: constructive critique, recognition of avoidable mistakes, and speculation about viable,
large-scale post-war reconstruction projects. The ideal outcome would be identification of such a
project, suitable for near-term implementation, that could illuminate existing best practices along
with innovative new approaches to an old problem.

2
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Overview
The need for a deeper, more complete understanding of success factors for post-war
reconstruction is growing.

Small-scale, non-conventional wars—involving groups most easily identified by language,
religion, or place rather than nationality—have blossomed since the Cold War in a global
renaissance of civil conflict. These wars typically lack uniforms, leaders, rules, treaties,
conventions, exemptions, beginnings, and ends; their seeds are sown in the swampy terrain of
cultural identity and irredentism. Long obscured by macro-political rivalries, inter-ethnic conflict
has become ubiquitous. More specifically, since World War II there has been a clear shift in global
warfare trends from inter- to intra-state conflict: 59 of 64 wars occurring between 1945 and 1988
were intra-state or ‘civil’ wars, and during these conflicts about 80% of the war dead were killed
by someone of their own nationality.

This trend peaked around 1990 with the height of what Marshall terms the ‘Third World War’,
during which insecurity within states systematically led to violence between rival groups. During
this same period, 127 new sovereign states have been created, and 35 new international land
boundaries have been drawn since 1980.2 Currently, about 46 protracted civil conflicts are
ongoing, and of these approximately 87 per cent are grounded in contested group rights or
threatened collective identity. The last five years have witnessed significant inter-cultural
hostilities in Afghanistan, Angola, East Timor, Chechnya, Dagestan, Iraq, Kosovo, India, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, the Philippines, and Rwanda, and this kind of hostility is
on the rise worldwide.3

Civilian urban populations have been severely affected by the surge of inter-ethnic warfare; in
relative terms, they have recently suffered more than during any other period. In World War I,
for example, about 43% of all battle-related deaths were civilian. That figure rose to around 59%
in the course of World War II, and since then—during a period when the number of wars within
states overtook the number between states—civilian deaths constituted approximately 74% of the
wartime totals.4 The scale and intensity of psychological trauma suffered by non-combatants has
risen proportionately, and urban residents are especially prone to overwhelming loss,
dislocation, and prolonged anxiety.

As the state of contemporary warfare rapidly devolves towards fratricidal conflicts, the
likelihood of purposeful violence in historic, heterogeneous cities increases proportionately.
3

Volume 6

Center for Macro Projects and Diplomacy Working Paper Series

Spring 2005

Examples of this phenomenon abound: demolition and bloodshed surrounding the sacred temple
complex of Ayodhya, in Gujurat; the calculated destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas; the felling
of the Old Bridge in Mostar; the toppling of Hussein statues in Baghdad; the razing of the World
Trade Center towers, etc. These global trends and statistics pose challenging questions about
where future wrecks may take place, how they are to be avoided, and who should be on hand to
assist when disasters occur.

Traditionally, the scene of a wreck is treated as an emergency and the most urgent symptoms are
quickly addressed by a familiar international consortium of government agencies, aid
organizations, humanitarian relief groups, environmental organizations and others. Plans for
recovery and rebuilding are quickly drafted and implemented. Conventional wisdom asserts
that stepping back to study the traditional social needs and expectations of a beleaguered
community is a luxury that cannot be afforded while basic survival is not yet assured. Even when
traditional or emblematic built environments are used as targets during these destructive
episodes, the built environment profession rarely presents itself as a potential partner for these
reconstruction programs. The field tends to remain aloof, waiting to offer expert assistance only
after stable resolutions have been achieved and other more “basic” forms of assistance have been
delivered. In most cases, this sluggishness costs architects, urban planners, and conservators
opportunities to make creative and serious contributions. As a result, valuable expertise is
subtracted from the social development processes.

Such habits and assumptions need to be overturned; built environment professionals need to
fully realize their potential to contribute in direct and meaningful ways to collaborative social
revitalization efforts where architecture is targeted or group identity is violently contested. One
objective of this paper is to illuminate paths forward in this direction.

Objectives & Approach
This paper is intended to contribute information and suggestions to a larger discussion of
reconstruction during an international conference to be hosted in 2005 by the CMPD. The object
of that discussion is the identification and elaboration of a large-scale physical intervention
designed to embody optimal ideas and strategies for reconstruction.

Rather than rely exclusively on broad stroke recommendations extrapolated from the
professional literature, well-documented case studies will be compared in order to identify
patterns and draw conclusions of a practical nature. These cases have been selected to reveal the
4
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course of reconstruction under different social, political, and economic conditions; they also show
the impacts of certain strategies over time. After collecting useful insights from previous research
and gleaning patterns from the selected case studies, a list of key concerns will be presented
along with a handful of recommendations for further inquiry and new project design.

Assumptions & Definitions
This working paper has adopted a comparative, case study approach because it assumes the
transferability of good solutions and strategies from one post-disaster scenario to another. It
takes for granted the reader’s interest in patterns of success and error in this domain as well as a
practical interest in forging improved approaches to post-disaster rehabilitation from a
professional perspective. Emphasis is placed on the physical environment with full awareness
that structural and spatial concerns should never be divorced from their social functions and
impacts.

Frederick Cuny has pointed out that disaster, whether natural or man-made, is a process
“defined on the basis of its human consequences, not on the phenomenon that caused it.”5 That
is, an earthquake or tidal wave does not constitute a disaster unless someone is there to
experience powerful negative impacts. His writing makes clear that a disaster is not just an
emergency or an isolated episode because it stems from developmental patterns preceding
calamitous events by years, decades, or centuries. The same forces that created vulnerability in a
traumatized society prior to disaster continue to affect that community during and after
reconstruction. Abiding by this supposition immediately makes post-war reconstruction a topic
intimately tied to class, public policy, and civil society writ large. Disaster should be measured
by relief agencies in terms of social, psychological, physical, economic, and political disruption.
Accordingly, disaster can be viewed as the product of longstanding development patterns that
promote conditions associated with human trauma. Further, these traumas result from impacts at
different levels--individual, group, institutional, national, global6--each of which experiences the
disaster differently in a kind of chain reaction. If, as many researchers have asserted, ‘disaster’
itself must be defined as a series of widening rings of social disruption, then it is fitting to
consider war a subset of the set of all disasters in the nomenclature of recovery assistance. For
the purposes of this investigation, no semantic distinction will be made between war and
disaster.

Disaster is a process stemming from a combination of hazards, vulnerabilities, and pressures.
These are related to the social and physical circumstances of a community; they may have their
5
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roots in chronic cycles of poverty, underdevelopment, corruption, or political exploitation. These
causes are often overlooked in favor of attributing a crisis to a single event--a mudslide, typhoon,
fire, battle, etc. The most effective relief efforts proceed from an understanding of underlying
factors and do not compound them.

Synthesis of Research
Following a review of several relevant studies7, a handful of recurrent themes have been
identified and briefly summarized below.

Reconstruction as Part of Development Continuum
A prominent scholar of post-war reconstruction has noted that “while disasters produce death,
injury, heartbreaking economic loss, and widespread disruption, recovery from disaster should
not be seen as a set of issues, decisions and events occurring in isolation from long-term trends in
the community. The drama of the emergency and restoration periods fades, and the ongoing
forces that produced the characteristics of the pre-disaster city re-emerge as the primary
determinants of the city of the future.”8 The notion that recovery is part of a larger development
narrative, and subject to the same forces that precipitated disaster, is borrowed as a fundamental
assumption here.

Two important concepts follow: that measurable “disaster potential” is linked with local cycles of
poverty9 and that the roots of poverty are nearly identical to the roots of vulnerability: lack of
resources, failure of government to allocate resources fairly, shrinking land and economic
opportunity in conjunction with rising populations, inordinate emphasis on technology and
modernization, urbanization, increased disenfranchisement, expectations, unemployment, etc.

Comparative research suggests that inherent strengths, weaknesses, and liabilities of a
community are amplified in the course of confronting a disaster:
In our case studies, we find strong evidence for acceleration of pre disaster trends in
recovery. Simply stated, rapidly growing cities recover rapidly; stable, stagnant or
declining cities recover slowly and may even have their decline accelerated.10
These observations are not meant to discount the value of effective post-disaster response; relief
agency activity is one important factor among several that affects overall recovery time. Cuny
notes that agencies can directly affect the several variables which speed recovery—including the
6
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clarity of policy and direction, collective motivation of participants, good communications, the
availability of technical assistance, adequate cash flow, and the reuse of salvaged materials--as
well as those which slow it, such as administrative delays, misappropriation of limited resources,
and the solicitation or receipt of irrelevant aid.

Most disasters, regardless of their root causes, result in a recovery process with recognizable
phases. The period immediately following a catastrophe is the emergency phase, devoted to
rescue, assessment, and critical repairs to the infrastructure; the second phase is transitional,
when residents return to normal patterns of work and social relations while permanent repairs to
public utilities are undertaken; the final phase involves reconstruction, during which the final
reordering of the community and its environment is conceived and accomplished.11 At the same
time, a single disaster will affect different communities—and different sectors of the same
community—in varied ways. Knowledge of pre-disaster social conditions and support structures
can allow agencies to predict and prepare for the consequences of disaster that occur outside
their sphere of influence.

Geipel12 goes further to outline the consequences of lackluster interventions in a worst-case
scenario. It is posited that when the policies of intervening agencies for reconstruction are not
defined, instruments for recovery not strictly applied, and incoming funds are diverted, the
following results can be expected:

In the short-term (within 1 year), relief supplies are consumed by ‘first aid actions’ and seep
away, along with the first wave of solidarity and public enthusiasm; projects proceed
haphazardly with no master planning or guidance from above; subsidies promised never
quite materialize, lost in financial power structures.
In the mid-term (2-5 years), donation of relief supplies dwindle as positive resonance among
victims is difficult to perceive; central government and international relief organizations
withdraw from disaster area; news of catastrophe and its results disappears from headlines;
general apathy results while people wait for help from the outside and struggle with a poor
flow of information.
In the longer-term (5-20 years), affected citizens are left to a free enterprise system of
recuperation based on pre-disaster levels of wealth and connections to decision makers; local
economy suffers; traditional bonds of trust between people and their leadership are severely
strained; social ties and institutions must be mended without the benefit of prior needs
assessment or coordinated planning.
This phasing scheme suggests that effective long-term disaster response planning must be
viewed as a social rehabilitation process operating in the context of local development, not as a
7
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program for the provision of material aid.13 Activation of the local economy and restitution of
employment is frequently more important for disaster victims than material aid after the
emergency phase. Relief agencies must recognize the hierarchy of community needs and address
their efforts to the highest-ranking concerns possible. Every contribution and project should be
planned and weighed in relation to these priorities and be synchronized with an appropriate
phase of recovery; for instance, material contributions of food and clothing may be effective
within weeks of a crisis but insulting if presented months later, when community focus has
shifted towards the process of regaining self-sufficiency.

The length of each advanced phase can be typically expressed as a constant multiple of the length
of the emergency phase, which reflects both disaster magnitude and the available societal
resources. The speed of the entire process is predicated on levels of pre-war prosperity, the
nature of damages suffered, and the quality of leadership devoted to reconstruction.14 More
specifically, it has been shown by Kates and Pijawka’s longitudinal disaster relief studies that the
duration of a reconstruction process (R) following the event of disaster is a function of the length
of the emergency phase (E) such that

t (R) = t (E ) k
where k is a constant whole multiple related to local pre-disaster trends, the scale of damages
suffered, and the resources available for recovery.15 While it is quite early to make any reliable
analysis of the success of reconstruction procedures in Dubrovnik, which are still in an immature
phase according to the theoretical models presented by Cuny et al, an assessment of the
emergency phase will shed some light on the shape and character of later phases. Projects
undertaken by local and international organizations in Dubrovnik will be examined and
compared to the patterns already observed in the post-war and natural disaster relief case
studies.
It follows that prompt intervention of outside agencies in the process of post-war recovery
appears critical. Hesitation tends to erode trust in foreign agencies and forfeits the ability to
influence tactical decision-making. Many habits are formed, for better or for worse, in the initial
stages of reconstruction:
If you’re there immediately, I think a lot can be done. If it happens that you’re there
waiting for two years…then the train will be leaving without you.16

8
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Reconstruction Economics Tied to Political Incentives
Rarely does a central government subsidize projects on principle; more often, reconstruction is tied to
discernible political priorities. The simplest of these would be the belief that certain historic sites are
strongly associated with patriotism and the national identity; when these monuments are threatened
in war their rehabilitation strengthens morale during periods of transition. Middelburg, Warsaw,
Coventry, Kuwait, and Dubrovnik all fall fairly cleanly into this category. A variant on this theme
links reconstruction activities more generally with the image of a strong and resolute government,
creating the impression that an organized, efficient, and still prosperous state has emerged from the
vicissitudes of war. This is a kind of public relations governments are typically eager to subsidize
whether or not it characterizes their administration well; it was a factor in Iraq (1992 and 2003),
Beirut (1995), and Coventry (1945).

Propaganda is the instrument of this promotion, and recovery projects that have benefited from
media attention are generally more successful than those that do not. Reconstruction in Coventry was
stalled during the war; the project’s eventual success can be ascribed to the powers of effective postwar promotion of the city as a national symbol of hope, pride, camaraderie, etc. Similarly, positive
publicity for the heroic effort of Warsaw’s planners insured support for the reconstruction and
ongoing preferential treatment for the city as an icon of Polish resistance. American media exposure
undoubtedly fostered international interest in the rehabilitation of Kabul following the fall of the
Taliban.

What becomes of the relief efforts without national publicity campaigns, and those that receive
negative publicity? Donor fatigue develops early in politically weak, relatively poor countries. Some
observers note that international involvement in underdeveloped nations is conditioned on the need
for immediate humanitarian assistance, a direct or indirect threat to the security of the donor nation,
and the prospect of enhanced trade or commercial ventures with the recipient nation. If none of
these conditions can be satisfied, international aid is not likely to appear. The power dynamics
underlying post-war reconstruction, in conjunction with public perceptions shaped by the media,
dictate the terms of project funding and support. Wealthy nations like Britain and Kuwait are bound
only by the logistics of supply and demand; poorer nations should incorporate the expectation of
delays and disappointments into their comprehensive plan.

Planners in Coventry isolated the problem of investment strategy well when they examined the
problem of whose capital would do the rebuilding of retail/commercial centers. They realized
that letting free market dictate the tempo and character of post-war development would mean
9
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letting go of aesthetic controls, but government grants were soon to expire and local revenues
could not meet all of the projected needs, so they faced “a rather unwelcome choice: they might
either have to opt for a smaller, cheaper, more revenue-oriented scheme or call in private capital
and thereby jeopardize the aesthetic and coordinated nature of the development.”17 Local
authorities won additional support from London when they drew attention to the revenueproducing tourist potential of the restored site. Beirut’s Solidere confronted similar dilemmas
without resorting to government support, as discussed later.

Reconstruction in Middelburg employed an orderly scheme of financing from the private sector,
where property was allocated to private owners who were subsequently responsible for the costs
of repairs specified by the master plan, as well as the legal obligations that went with it. Those
who would benefit most from the revitalization of the city would assume the largest share of the
costs; all residents were expected to contribute in some form.18

Familiarity with such market-driven, self-supporting system can be crucial. Foreign interest in
the recovery of a community diminishes as it enters into the later stages of reconstruction,
putting the implementation of long-term solution constantly out of reach of the NGO’s active
there.19 Charitable funding mechanisms show a strong and sentimental bias towards the early
phases of recovery and the physical aspects of reconstruction, prompting the cynical insiders’
slogan “No bombs, no money”; this unfortunate trend deserves further study. This logic is not
in keeping with the findings of several longitudinal studies regarding the long-term effectiveness
of reconstruction efforts, which call for increasingly incremental and sustained infusions of
financial support across all major phases of recovery.

It has also been noted that infusions of foreign aid can have numerous unintended negative
impacts: fostering of unequal or negative growth; exacerbation of competition in an environment
of acute scarcity; abrupt shifts in local income and wealth; increasing resources available to
continue the conflict; discouraging local organization s, anticipating foreign support based on
acute need, to assume fiscal responsibilities or reveal their full capacity; disrupting local
economies.20 Accordingly, it is not unusual to find that aid aggravates the same tensions it is
meant to assuage.
Successful reconstruction is characterized by decreasing levels of external manpower and funding
over time. While higher levels may be beneficial in the short-term, the longer they remain in place,
the more difficult it will be to achieve a successful reconstruction.21

10
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Disaster relief should be more than an international charity drive. Research indicates clearly that
local skills and materials alone can sometimes rebuild a community when properly identified
and managed. Sound management includes thorough conceptualization of community needs
and project goals, the provision of an ongoing framework for shared decision making and
management, exploration and presentation of all available options for revitalization,
development of incremental and flexible budgets which take into account unstable, inflationary
economic conditions. Agencies must also remain aware of their own institutional limitations in
terms of authority, energy, political support, and expert capabilities; planning should be oriented
to the strengths of the interveners and the community being served.

Retention v. Upgrade
A common tendency in the realm of post-war reconstruction is to skirt what appear to be ephemeral
concerns in favor of high-visibility projects promising speedy, palpable results. While these projects
boost community morale and lend immediate credibility to implementing agencies, their benefits are
often short-lived. When it becomes obvious that the momentum cannot be sustained and that
sacrifices must be made by local residents, enthusiasm wanes. It is at these times—following the
emergency phase, when cooperation and funding begin to diminish—that the functional well being
of the city demands the attention of relief professionals.

Successful post-war recovery efforts recognize war as a crisis of associations, in which the
psychological well being and civic identity of a community is threatened as the built environment is
destroyed. Often this destruction is calculated by aggressors who wish to inflict a special kind of
suffering upon the native population tied to campaigns of demoralization, demographic engineering,
and political demystification.

The example of Dresden shows how a politically crippled nation and traumatized local community
confronted the loss of a treasured historic city. A major cultural center before WW2, approximately
85% of the town was destroyed by allied bombing in 1945. German authorities attempted to
reconstruct traditional facades and structures in the historic quarters, resulting in an imprecise
imitation of the original streetscapes “whose representational pretension was in total contradiction to
the social and economic reality in the GDR.”22 It can be assumed that the effort and expense of an
anachronistic rebuilding program was weighed in relation to intangible public benefits tied to
sentimental associations with the affected monuments.

11
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Polish officials made a similar judgment regarding the devastated central core of Warsaw, and
pursued their intention to reconstruct the Old Town with astonishing determination. Throughout
the German siege Warsaw’s ‘soldier-architects’ protected historic documentation and designed plans
for reconstruction even while the buildings were collapsing around them. The power and vitality of
the city was proven after the war when thousands of residents returned from the countryside to an
urban landscape literally reduced to rubble. Their collective efforts, beginning from nothing,
eventually restored the original appearance of inner Warsaw through a program of arduous research
and reconstruction. In 1946 a writer for The Warsaw Escarpment attempted to explain why a return to
architectural prototypes seemed so essential:
If the Warsaw community is to be reborn, if its core is to be constituted by former Warsawians,
then they have to be given back their old rebuilt Warsaw to some extent, so that they can see in it
the same city, though considerably altered, and not a different town on the same spot. One must
take into consideration the fact that individual attachment to old forms is a factor of social unity.
It is also possible that Hitler’s well-documented intentions to build a new town on ruins of Warsaw
made the resurrection of Poland’s capitol a necessary demonstration of defiance and resilience.
Warsaw addressed the post-war crisis of civic identity head on, literally resurrecting the spaces and
symbols of its past; other victims of war in Europe did not have that luxury.

In 1940 Orléans, France was largely destroyed by fires as German soldiers advanced towards Paris.
One resident asked upon finding his home town in ruins, “What was left of the Chancellery, of the
rue Royale, of the rue Tabor, of everything that gave Orléans charm and honour?”23 The architecture
which had so long been a silent witness to the life of the town was gone, and its embodiment of the
community had been so complete that its fabric had become inseparable from the social values it
once reflected. In keeping with the aggressor’s intentions, something had been taken which was
extremely difficult to replace. Many towns would subsequently struggle with the problem of how to
respond to such a loss in practical and effective ways.

Post-war planners in Middelburg, Holland, sought to reify to the ‘vernacular norms’ which had
dictated the streetscapes of the historic quarter before the town was bombed in 1940. Guided by
what was considered the ‘typical Middelburg atmosphere’ in an attempt to restore the symbolic
effects of Dutch architecture, designers rejected facsimiles for a loose interpretation of indigenous
styles. City officials also preferred “the flexibility and political feasibility of traditionalism” to
contemporary design and the painstaking process of accurate reconstruction. Their intention to
evoke the image of a model city resurrected after war was not realized; the designs were generally
regarded as lifeless and inauthentic with respect to the past and poor responses to residential needs

12
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with respect to the present.24 Despite its long-term failure, the recovery process was an exercise of
resistance and pride for the nation.

In the course of post‐war recovery, cities like these came to realize that bombardment of civilian
centers inflicts wounds upon a nation’s morale which are slow to heal. They grappled with the
essential qualities of historic sites in the search for organized responses:
From one day to the next, in half of the cities in Europe, the romantic ruins of classic
antiquity were mixed together with the modern ruins of war. For the first time in our
country, the sophisticated and cerebral preoccupations of a few enlightened spirits to
conserve the testimonies of an immense artistic heritage was replaced by the anguish of
the common people when they saw not only their often modest homes, but also their
spiritual and cultural patrimony destroyed.25
Infliction of indirect damages on a populace through aerial bombardment of cultural centers became
part of orthodox military strategy after the winter of 1942.26 Undertaken with great precision by two
of Europe’s most antiquarian nations, this wicked precedent echoes across many subsequent conflicts
up to the present. Increasingly, the effects of war would be tallied in terms this kind of ‘anguish’ as
cultural sites routinely became targets. Accordingly, strategies for recovery in such cases must be
developed with the psychological needs of the affected community as a central concern.

Often the destruction of cities wrought by war is viewed by planners as an opportunity to improve
and revise them. The aftermath of WW2 coincided with the popularity of the urban renewal
movement in Europe, where the links between urban structure and social welfare were investigated
with unprecedented interest and optimism. Architects during this period frequently approached
post-war reconstruction with a mind to redress a site’s prewar ills or reconfigure it completely with
new emphasis on modern convenience, health, amenity, zoning, etc. Planning which repeated
outmoded urban forms was regarded with increasing disdain in this period, and new theoretical
approaches promised “no less than the well housed, socially acceptable, environmentally attractive
city, to replace the outmoded, unhealthy, over-congested city of the past.”27 After the war, urban
designers rushed to test these notions in the cities ravaged by the war.

One writer observes that, in light of this general enthusiasm, “when the bombs fell, it was no wonder
that reconstruction groups from Warsaw to Coventry sprang up within days with practical schemes
for the rebuilding of their cities.”28 Function-oriented goals of urban renewal frequently competed
with the public’s desire for restitution of cherished scales, monuments, and details. Professionals in
charge of recovery had to balance these disparate agendas. Warsaw planners struck a rather rigid
13

Volume 6

Center for Macro Projects and Diplomacy Working Paper Series

Spring 2005

bargain; permission to replicate the historic urban core was effectively traded for the simultaneous
development of the outer industrial bands according to updated economic models which completely
re configured the functional zones of the city with minimal concession to preexisting patterns.
The reconstruction plan for Coventry, where 90% of urban core was damaged during an 11 hour
Luftwaffe raid in 1940, addressed the ills which had plagued it before the war while it confronted
extensive losses. In the years leading up the raid, a rapidly expanding working class had overtaxed
the city’s infrastructure and poor zoning practices had largely eliminated open public spaces; during
this time the Labor party had campaigned successfully on a reform platform specifically directed at
city planning. Given a chance to implement their policies on Coventry’s ‘clean slate,’ a new city was
subsequently designed around principles centered on users and functions, not the remaining urban
fabric. The success of this approach placed Coventry “in the center of complimentary discourses
celebrating planning and anticipating the shape of an improved postwar world” and was accepted as
a model for recovery planning in other European cities with similar prewar conditions.29

Planners pressed urban renewal to its conceptual limit in their designs for reconstruction in
Hamburg, Germany, bombarded in 1943 by Allied forces. True to some of their destructive
programs underway in occupied territories at the time, German designers attempted to negate all
historic tradition with renewal based on the “eternal” traits of local topography:
[In Hamburg] urban planning somehow completed the destruction of the urban
centers. The experience of the aerial warfare and of the Third Reich created an
invincible faith in a better future, as if a look back into history would allow only
a look into an unfathomable pit.30
This pit, in the case of many damaged cities, appeared to harbor numerous ‘unhealthy’ elements; the
threats they posed were interpreted broadly in social and political terms. Because they believed that
contaminated housing produced a politically radicalized and biologically weakened working class,
one writer noted that these planners “almost welcomed the destruction of the metropolis as an
already ‘dead’ social form of human organization.”31 They were the authors of recovery schemes
that advocated total dislocation and severance with the past: abandoning the bombed sites, plowing
over the rubble, and starting new cities elsewhere.

Post-war reconstruction is often fraught with tension between popular nostalgia and professional
ambition. Each camp believes its expectations are most in keeping with the trajectory of pre-war
urban development. When present, both need to be acknowledged as implementation of recovery
activities proceeds.
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Utilization of Local Coping Mechanisms
Because theoretical approaches to post-war reconstruction are generally formulated from the
point of view of an intervener, there is a tendency for agencies to underestimate the value of local
resources and adopt a polarized—if benevolent—framework in which to understand their
relationship with the local community, expressed in terms of victims and providers, amateurs
and experts, or passive and active participants.

Cuny notes how this polarity can generate distrust and discourage public participation, greatly
decreasing the potency of relief efforts. Members of the affected community should be treated as
the clients, not simply the beneficiaries, of intervening agencies32.

The intention to help relieve disaster-related distress is not enough to insure success, regardless
of the resources applied to agency projects; a strict and diligent commitment to locally
sustainable solutions is also necessary. Without it, relief programs can become self-defeating:
...many agencies have a very unsophisticated view of relief operations, and many feel
that because they are trying to do good work, the impact cannot be negative. In most
cases, this is the most restricting factor: failure of the agencies to look beyond what
appears to be self-evident and to explore in-depth the impact of their programs...unless
mechanisms are developed to hold interveners accountable to the victims, post-disaster
programs will continue to have only limited and mostly negative impact.33
Mechanisms must allow for review and revision of these programs by local authorities.
Communities should be encouraged to express their demands prior to implementation and
exercise significant control in the management of projects. Success can be measured in relation to
an agency’s contributions to the community: the alleviation of suffering or burdens, the
strengthening of local coping mechanisms, a shortening of the period between emergency and
full recovery, fostering a sense of safety, etc.

But an inherent tension exists where foreign intervention meets local initiative; the risks of
undermining local coping mechanisms and creating destructive dependencies has already been
mentioned. Often the meeting becomes a strained dialog between theory and pragmatism, the
ideal and the real. Ample opportunity for misinterpretation, disappointment, and insensitivity
makes the prospect of intervention daunting from the outset, if the forewarnings of disaster
response studies are trusted. The post-war scenario is substantially more complicated, and
conventional wisdom suggests that outsiders should wait until warring factions have settled their
differences before attempting to assess local needs or offer guidance. No such logic would hold
15
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for natural disaster response; although the aftermath of an earthquake is unstable and chaotic, the
value of timely aid is widely acknowledged.

A special exception is frequently made for war-related disaster, where the political character of
the crisis becomes a pretext for restraint on the part of agencies concerned with cultural heritage.
Some organizations are only too willing to exempt their resources and efforts from what may
appear to be a bottomless pit of unrest and violence. Once this mistaken premise is corrected,
disaster response can be conditioned not on the causes of a crisis, but on its results.

The scale of damages, the need for specialized advice, and the weakness of native response
mechanisms caused by warfare usually make external support for recovery necessary. When the
problem is divided appropriately, all interested relief agencies can adopt portions of the work
which suit their strengths and degree of commitment. Numerous forms of provisional
involvement can be undertaken safely by international agencies from the moment cultural sites
are threatened. Interim planning can form the basis of more permanent reconstruction efforts
later on.

Funding may be a low priority for reconstruction efforts despite local scarcity. Research suggests
that the strength personal leadership at the local level determines the availability of resources,
given a reliable base of knowledge.34 One observer has noted that in sensitive post-war scenarios
professionals should act as “people, not specialists” in light of special psychological
circumstances which do not allow for orthodox approaches.35 Expertise must be joined with an
empathetic involvement with the community affected by disaster.

It is incumbent upon foreign agencies participating in the recovery process to recognize the
functional units, both public and private, of the affected community. If the local coping
mechanisms are ignored, local authorities may be undermined and a harmful dependency on
foreign aid could be formed. One study remarks:
The disaster and the havoc that it causes form only one part of the picture. The ways in
which agencies respond to disasters and the implication of that response for the
development of the affected countries are of major concern, for inappropriate responses,
constituting a second disaster, occur frequently.36
The recovery methods which are non-disruptive to the community should be adopted by outside
interveners. A failure to embrace them often erodes faith in local remedies and paralyzes local
incentive with an ongoing expectation of aid.37 Cuny’s thorough analysis lays heavy emphasis
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on the perils of paternalism stemming from an incomplete understanding of local systems and
hasty infusions of support:
Certainly a demonstration of massive response points to the inadequacy of the local
government and its agencies; and the more decision making that is removed from the
local community, the more the feeling of helplessness is accentuated.
Outside organizers of relief and revitalization have to work hard simply to avoid becoming a
further detriment to the affected community.
The necessity of integrated, cooperative approaches to disaster recovery planning is a recurrent
theme in the research literature. It is of equal importance to post-war planning. Because the need
for foreign assistance implies a relationship of dependency at the outset of recovery, shared
decision-making practices become crucial. Relationships between insiders and outsiders must be
clearly and properly delimited: to the degree practicable, foreign interveners should assume a
subordinate role to local authority and the plans they introduce should complement existing sitebased processes. Neither they, nor the aid they provide, should compete with local hierarchies or
economies.38

Many essential services do not require funding and can only be provided locally. One
Dubrovnik architect suggested that her work after the war illuminated the human realities of her
situation and how her training could address them:
I am a social worker. I have to have a very good understanding of individual necessity
and social necessity in order to make good architecture.39
It is useful to view every aspect of post-war revitalization as a form of social work, where
problems must be solved using the language of relationships, meanings, and lifestyles in order to
be considered effective. Architects, economists, engineers, and conservators working in the
realm of post-war reconstruction will be called upon in this way to unite the moral and material
components of problems they address.

The ideal reconstruction plan would rely exclusively on local professionals in the allied building
and preservation fields since they possess the most intimate knowledge of affected sites and can
maintain a consistent presence on site. Foreign interveners who wish to augment a local
reconstruction team should research the academic programs operating prior to the war and
assess the professional base at the local level before assigning their own representatives to a
project. Often, local professionals have left the town in search of employment elsewhere or to
enter military service, further depleting the base of knowledge and technical capacity. Local
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claims to the contrary should not hinder foreign agencies from recommending that outside
reinforcements be employed to assure a well-rounded effort. This dilemma is best resolved
through cross-cultural training missions and a vigorous, systematic exchange of professional
knowledge.

The need for rapid, large scale response to wartime disaster generally requires the immediate
involvement of central governmental authority in the recovery process. The most successful recovery
plans allow for this authority--lopsided during the emergency phase--to be eventually shared with
local agencies which will carry out the majority of long-term projects. A power balance is necessary
for public acceptance of the program: central government can insure continuity and local
administrators can respond more directly to community needs throughout the process of
reconstruction.

Recovering communities face a different challenge when central governmental authority has been
severely weakened or distracted by the war. In Dresden, reconstruction plans suffered continually
during the postwar years due to instability on a national level following Germany’s capitulation; the
political and legal frameworks necessary for large-scale reconstruction were not made available until
1949, when authority was centralized with the Ministry for Reconstruction was given the right of free
expropriation of formerly private property. Instability and uncertainty continued to hinder
comprehensive efforts, however, as occupying governments pursued divergent recovery policies
within their respective sectors and government funding was diverted to war reparations.40 In
Warsaw, Soviet sponsorship of recovery activities after the war resulted in a vexing trade-off: the
historic quarter was restored at the expense of the other sections of the city – dismissed at the time as
worthless monuments to bourgeois values--which were demolished in advance of large projects tied
to the newly centralized socialist economy. The values of a ruling political party or reconstruction
patron are inevitably reflected in the character of post-war reconstruction.
Many studies have recommended that the most successful post-disaster plans are centered on
local human needs and engineered according to local capacities in order to sustain long-term
progress. Isolated restoration projects undertaken by foreign agencies that do not strengthen
local self-reliance are frequently counter-productive, and foreign aid not used to leverage other
funds or rebuild regional revenue-producing activity yields disappointing results. Any schemes
for recovery initiated by foreign interveners, regardless of how carefully formulated or executed,
will prove inadequate if they fail to engage the public which they serve through direct
involvement, and ultimately, through the transfer of responsibility.
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The preceding concerns point to an overarching rule for post-disaster interventions: repair local
systems first, and allow these to sustain long-term reconstruction. The health of communities,
social functions, political mechanisms, and industries should be attended to before individual
sites are addressed. A systems approach avoids idiosyncratic and uncoordinated projects which
squander resources and undermine public confidence in the recovery process. Davis emphasizes
this notion further when he suggests that the planning system should be the first item to be
reviewed by recovery officials given “the very much more demanding context of reconstruction
planning.”41 Other researchers have pointed to the fallacy, implied here, of the uncritical
implementation of procedures and policies developed during peacetime in a post-war scenario.

Adequate Access to Information & Resources
In many cases, foreign professionals with access to major libraries may have more pertinent
information at their disposal than on-site officials in a war-torn area. This imbalance may be
rectified with the judicious use of the telecommunications media and selective reproduction of
key documents by outside agents. This cooperative approach to information gathering was used
to protect endangered cultural assets during WW2, when the American Defense-Harvard Group
and the American Council of Learned Societies prepared over 800 maps for Allied ground and air
forces indicating the location of art collections, monuments, and archives to be protected.42 It is
difficult to underestimate the importance of rapid access to reliable, complete documentation in
areas outside of routine supervision, where inhabitants will generate their own solutions to
reconstruction problems in the absence of timely, coordinated action.

Access to precedent studies and current professional research publications is generally limited
during the crucial post-conflict planning period due to weakened transportation and
communication links. While information flows easily towards American and European
audiences, the stream inwards towards local reconstruction authorities is often choked, though
this comparative material would improve the quality of recovery planning:
...more knowledge...I would appreciate any more experience concerning the job I am
doing...seeing the monuments which have been restored, either in a bad way or a good
way, to see the experiences around the world is the most important thing.43
Available methods and technologies for information transfer have yet to be fully exploited in
most post-conflict scenarios though they hold out a promise of higher standards for project
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management and implementation. Insofar as information can enable recovery officials to
strategize efficiently and locate sources of support on a continuous basis, it is more valuable than
money.
The availability of money, materials, and labor is central to successful revitalization. Availability
is rarely an issue in the context of peace and political stability, but numerous challenges arise in
the aftermath of war for the officials managing recovery. They must often ‘sell’ their project to
international relief agencies, foundations, foreign governments, or private donors in order to
secure the resources which are not available locally. Disaster recovery research shows that the
provision of international aid rapidly decreases following the emergency phase of relief, and
private foundations suffer from “donor fatigue” when regional tensions create long-term
demands on philanthropic sources after the conflict has disappeared from the headlines.44
A thorough understanding of these trends should help to break up local dependencies on foreign
aid, and recommend more active solutions to the problem of project funding. Appropriate
methods of commercial solicitation which are familiar to observers of market-based economies
may not be obvious to local authorities where disaster occurs. In some cases the language of
investment and finance must be learned quickly in response to the specific needs of
reconstruction, including mastery of intricate real estate financing, cost benefit analysis, and
marketing research that can unlock investment potential and generate income to support
reconstruction in low profile districts.45

Despite a large body of research, Geipel has noted several problems which hamper reliable
assessment of long-term recovery patterns in disaster areas. Most studies, it is observed, fail to
discuss the social and political conditions leading up to the disaster event and thereby forfeit
critical insights which might inform the recovery process. Longitudinal studies are rare due to
the impatience of researchers and the logistic difficulties of organizing such work. When
multiple lateral examples are compared, the information collected for any one event is often too
thin to sustain rigorous comparisons.

It is suggested that the necessary long-term studies are rare because “research in the AngloAmerican context has a short attention span and jumps from event to event. As long as the
media dwell on a certain disaster, funds flow freely and research pays off.” One interesting
aspect of this difficulty stems from the perceptions of graduate students who conduct much of
the field research. Geipel points out that they are motivated by overt conditions of poverty,
destruction, and distress to travel and work in disaster areas, but are unlikely to devote
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themselves to longitudinal research projects which revisit areas already re-stabilized and in
advanced stages of recovery. As a result, it is suggested, the paucity of research data in these
later phases makes the search for “applicable regularities and strategies for dealing with future
catastrophes” unusually difficult.46

Recovery benefits from the work of relief agencies that take advantage of the lessons from the
past and available information pertaining to local conditions. When this background material is
ignored, delay and inconsistency can erode public confidence in a post-war climate already prone
to widespread cynicism and complacency.

Case Studies
The preceding section explored some key concepts regarding effective post-war reconstruction
that emerged from recent studies. Below, a new set of issues is introduced through brief review
of six case studies. A comparison of Coventry and Dubrovnik has been made to demonstrate to
show the special constrains of short, medium, and long-term reconstruction efforts; a
comparison of Beirut and Mostar has been made to demonstrate the relative effectiveness of
different institutional actors in the reconstruction process; a comparison of Warsaw and Belfast
has been made to demonstrate how the effectiveness of any single post-conflict reconstruction
strategy depends on the type of conflict that precipitated disaster.

Effectiveness of Reconstruction in Relation to Phase
Successful short-term responses to post-war recovery needs do not always translate into
successful long-term development strategies. A cursory examination of selected reconstruction
activities in post-war Coventry (1941-1962) and Dubrovnik (1993-1999) will bear out a few
important pitfalls and faulty assumptions.

Coventry
The post-war redevelopment of Coventry took place approximately between 1941 and 1962,
when the new cathedral was consecrated. Coventry was the victim of one of the most
devastating aerial attacks of the early phase of World War II; on 14 November 1940, it suffered
the first of two major aerial bombardments which destroyed much of the existing city center and
damaged two thirds of the city’s housing stock. During this raid, 449 German bombers dropped
around 500 tons of high explosives and more than 40,000 incendiary bombs. As a result 975
buildings in the city center were damaged within a core area of 223 acres.47 Overnight Coventry
became the most devastated city in England.
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Coventry after bombardment (l-r): extensive damage to residential, sacred, and commercial structures.

The prospect of large-scale urban renewal preceded the war. Throughout the 1930s Coventry
prospered along with the automotive industry, but its rapid expansion during this period
resulted in traffic congestion and urban blight in the commercial core. A local newspaper
complained that the city was experiencing “an era of commercial revolution allied with civic
stagnation... generations of bad planning” and asserted that “the trouble saved up for the future
from an unimaginative past must be tackled.”48 An urban renewal scheme reflecting Modernist
ambitions entitled Coventry of Tomorrow was presented in May 1940 by a team of local urban
planners and architects.

Six months later these ambitious drawings were revisited to guide the reconstruction of a city
that had become nearly unrecognizable to its inhabitants. Early in 1941, the scheme was again
presented to the public as a Plan for the New Coventry: Disorder and Destruction: Order and Design—
a pamphlet reprinted from an article in Architect and Building News. It has been noted that soon
after “the rubble was cleared the City Architect and the Council were not slow to publicize the
positive aspect of the blitz and grasp the fact that the bombing had presented them with a clean
canvas on which to build a new city.”49 The plan was well-received by most authorities and
professionals in England; it was published as a booklet entitled The Future Coventry in 1945 and
included a set of guidelines for implementation. With many amendments and exclusions, this
vision of rebuilt Coventry authored by Donald Gibson became the master plan that gave shape to
the contemporary city.

The project embraced the heavy-handed and utopian ethic of Modernist principles that stressed,
order, separation of civic functions, hygiene, and a self-conscious break with historic building
strategies. Coventry’s post-war planners emphasized the virtues of swift, large-scale reconstruction,
enticing the public with futuristic, idealized images offered in sharp contrast with photos illustrating
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deficiencies of the pre-war city, especially the dilapidated historic fabric and areas beset with chronic
congestion, pollution and ugliness.

The damages wrought by the Luftwaffe were described with increasing ambivalence; the raid
seemed to have created an opportunity for Coventry to reinvent itself and correct problems that had
plagued the city for centuries. The planners’ scheme promised an “aesthetically and morally ordered
Modern townscape”50 and seemed to capture the popular desire for palpable revitalization,
disengagement from a traumatic past, and reassurance for a bright future.

Those promises were only partly kept. The massive funded needed to undertake such sweeping
changes was slow to materialize; during this lull immediately following the war, the residents of
Coventry were able to take a closer look at the forthcoming changes and discovered that not all of
them were welcome. Many familiar landmarks and streets had disappeared and were not to be
restored; older parts of the city considered unhealthy, unsightly, or inefficient by urban planners
were fondly remembered by local residents. The new Coventry that emerged brought many
disappointments, as pre-war residents felt their disorientation deepened and lamented the loss of
familiar, salvageable structures that did not fit modernized zoning requirements or aesthetic criteria.

A dense, organic city with a strong medieval character prior to the war, today Coventry is associated
with lifeless and drab public spaces hemmed in by austere, homogenized structures. While master
planner Gibson lamented that his spatial prescriptions failed due to a popular fixation on “dogs,
cinema, pubs and speedway”, one resident noted: “They kept putting little flower plots and raised
beds—but it was only to break up the concrete. It was a concrete city center.”51
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Coventry rebuilt (l-r): promotional booklet of 1945, Modernist projections, and pedestrian experience.

Coventry demonstrates how popular reconstruction plans, when generated quickly by a small
number of like-minded professionals in the absence of significant public consultation, can backfire.
The Coventry scheme seems to have failed simultaneously in several ways: it was grounded on
assumptions about the city’s growth and the social behavior of its residents that were not reliable, it
buried a past that still had psychological value to local communities, and it imposed a highly
integrated urban aesthetic that owed more to fashion than to pragmatism. While early phases of
reconstruction planning played effectively upon the intensified emotional climate of the immediate
post-war period, gaining support from all quarters, the late phases of implementation were often met
with skepticism and disappointment. Coventry seems to offer an warning against hasty, dogmatic,
broad stroke programs for post-war reconstruction.

Dubrovnik
As the former Yugoslavia was drawn and quartered by ethno-nationalist political entrepreneurs,
while political strategies were played out on the national and international levels, a punishment
was conceived by Serbian politicians for Croatia after it decided to leave the federation; a military
strategy of intimidation and repeated close-range shelling was implemented in and around the
Commune of Dubrovnik.

Mortar attacks from the sea, undertaken by the Yugoslav National Navy out of its home port in
the nearby Bay of Kotor, occurred on October 23 and 24, November 8 and 13, and December 6 of
1991, continuing on May 25, 29, 30, and 31 and June 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 17, and 20 of 1992. Some fire was
returned by ad hoc Croatian forces from the Napoleonic fortress on Srd mountain overlooking the
Old City and the harbor, to little effect. In the course of these episodes, approximately 2000 light
artillery rounds registered 314 direct hits to historic property within the city walls, resulting in
the destruction of nine buildings by fire52. In total, 68% of the 824 structures of the Old City were
affected; the majority of damages were to the clay tile roof fabrics of densely packed residences.
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When the navy retreated and the last fires were put out in the historic city, 43 civilian deaths had
been incurred.

The case of post-war reconstruction Dubrovnik is in many ways much more straightforward than
the Coventry example just examined. Where urban planners in Coventry made the mistake of
planning too much too soon it was too little input, planners in Dubrovnik to not have the option
to pursue such ambitious and totalizing postwar reconstruction schemes. Instead, they spend the
initial recovery. Waiting for international assistance and taking care of immediate survival needs
with very limited local resources. Because Dubrovnik had been such an important tourist
destination for so many decades prior to the outbreak of ethnic conflict in 1992, and because it
had been included for years on the World Heritage List, many inside the city assumed that their
fair weather friends and investors would it return during their time of greatest need to assist the
city in the process of rebuilding itself physically and socially.

This assumption turned out to be wrong. It was years before any significant and coordinated
foreign aid reached Dubrovnik, long after many of the most pressing reconstruction issues had
already been addressed in a piecemeal fashion.

Map of direct mortar hits (dots) to the historic core, 1991-1992.
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Dubrovnik during bombardment (l-r): harbor fires, residential loss due to incendiary bombs, church damage, main pedestrian axis.

A sentimental fondness for the historic sites of the Balkans, fostered during peacetime in light of
friendly and lucrative international relations, proved insufficient to gather international support
during the critical phases of local crisis in Dubrovnik:
The superficiality of our infatuation has been exposed…Behind a torn-up postcard, the
City surfaced as distant and utterly abandoned. At once, it became clear that it had
been alone for a long time, and that for years, it had lived misunderstood, in an
unhappy marriage with its inhabitants and neglected by its extended family, pushed
into a pretty but faded memento of an entire nation.53

When aid did arrive, it often appeared inappropriate or superficial. One good example was the
donation of tens of thousands of terra cotta roof tiles from the French government in 1994. Most
of the historic buildings in the walled city had lost all or part of their roofs, and all of those roofs
were tiled; still, the French tiles were of a color and shape quite different from the distinctive
Dubrovnik ones—famous for their golden color and fluted vertical profile—so that the donated
tiles stood out visually in an unforeseen way and made patching difficult, since the old and new
modules did not fit together well. Today, it is easy to appreciate the French contribution from
any rooftop, but the overall effect suggests hastiness, or insensitivity, or both.

Funding efforts for reconstruction in Dubrovnik serve as an illustration of the pitfalls of a nonsystems approach. The scattered and intermittent flow of donations into the Old City has been
previously mentioned, and portends numerous undesirable results: planning oriented to
earmarked moneys; inordinate emphasis on the structures of the Old Town due to lop-sided
media exposure; project development tied to an unstable federal budgetary allowance;
vulnerability to quick, lucrative development schemes, etc. Currently the reconstruction budget is
bound to forces which cannot be easily predicted or controlled. Recovery funding beyond the
emergency phase should be centered around a system of self-sustaining income managed on the
local level; in the case of Dubrovnik, the obvious generators are real estate and small-scale
tourism.
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Dubrovnik recovering: shops await repair funds in 1993, old and new tiles in evidence, piecemeal repairs by owner in historic core.

In several senses, the reconstruction process in Dubrovnik was the inverse of what transpired in
Coventry 50 years prior. The early stages in Dubrovnik were uncoordinated, week, underfunded, and undertaken outside of any master planning framework but the later stages
demonstrated it the value of local initiative and competence that grew during those first difficult
years following the cessation of hostilities. Having created or improved local mechanisms
through which large-scale reconstruction projects could be implemented, Croatian authorities
were in good position to orchestrate the ongoing projects required to return to some kind of
normal state of civic affairs. In addition, though difficult, lack of large-scale external support for
construction activities forced reconstruction to proceed incrementally and with significant local
input; though perhaps unintentional, this slower and halting process they have generated
superior results when compared to the highly conceptual and bureaucratized approaches used in
places like Coventry. There, spectacular early plans envisioned later gave way to disappointing
results in an abiding impression that more cooks in that reconstruction kitchen might have
improved the soup.

Dubrovnik demonstrates the value of restoring healthy local systems in the post-war scenario;
though sluggish and ambivalent foreign donor agencies, by their absence in the immediate postwar recovery period, did not intend to contribute to these systems, the long-term benefits of their
non-action is now apparent. By design or by neglect, leaving communities with usable tools and
training may constitute the highest form of external assistance.

Effectiveness of Reconstruction in Relation to Agency
Effectiveness of post-war reconstruction depends on the coordinating agent’s relationship to the
problems and local community. A cursory examination of selected reconstruction activities in
post-war Beirut (1990-present) and Mostar (1995-present) will illustrate the distinct merits and
weaknesses of rebuilding programs guided by market forces and the non-profit sector,
respectively.
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Beirut
Though very few comprehensive or reliable studies have been undertaken in Lebanon regarding
the impacts of the war since its conclusion, a number of scholars have attempted to estimate
losses incurred by Lebanese society since the outbreak of hostilities in 1975. Of a pre-war
population estimated at around 4 million, it is possible that Lebanon lost as many as 150,000 of its
citizens over 16 years of civil war. Two or three times that number were probably wounded
during the same period. Because the number of paramilitary combatants never exceeded a few
tens of thousands, is clear that the loss of civilian noncombatants was astonishingly high. In
addition to the casualties directly associated with it inter-ethnic violence, some estimates suggest
that as many as 700,000 Lebanese were displaced due to intimidation, property loss, and shifting
territorial acquisitions between rival ethnic groups, leaving the post-war population in 1993 at 2.7
million—less than three-quarters of the prewar level. According to every index imaginable, the
civil war was catastrophic for the country and 15 years later, the process of reconstruction is
ongoing.
What happens when not even a dysfunctional local government exists to provide a platform for
professional intervention? When municipal authorities are severely weak or disorganized, active
professionals must turn to other institutional frameworks. An interesting surrogate for municipal
authority is private investment. Deference to market forces allows experts once again to view
their involvement as neutral and non partisan—guided by the invisible hand of economics rather
than and discrete political agenda.
A near-perfect example of this approach is found in Beirut, where the creation of Solidere as a
guiding force for post-war urban reconstruction marked a symbolic abandonment of government
agencies in favor of private enterprise. Solidere attracted the best professional talent, foreign and
native, to the city with a clear set of objectives, ample funds, and an innovative business model—
all standing in sharp contrast to national and municipal offices that appeared demoralized,
disorganized, and decrepit by comparison. This ambitious undertaking provides a model for
market-driven interventions that provides another set of insights regarding how built
environment professionals can intervene in the divided city context without appearing to give up
their impartiality.
In the spring of 1994, a red line was drawn around the core of Beirut’s ruined central business
district and the entire parcel—including the most valuable real-estate in the city—was put up for
sale on the international market. The process was engineered and managed by the Lebanese
Company for the Development and Reconstruction of Beirut Central District (henceforth
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“Solidere”) with anchoring capital investment and a blessing from then-Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri. This tax-exempt, joint-stock corporation was made up of property rights holders and
investors holding stock in the downtown area. Possession of shares was determined by pre-war
ownership or cash subscription in U.S. dollars. Solidere’s shares are also traded on the secondary
stock market under the supervision of the Bank of Lebanon and in conjunction with 32 Lebanese
financial restitutions. From this point forward physical reconstruction in Beirut would be largely
synonymous with the activities of Solidere, which was given sole proprietary authority over all
decision-making related to physical reconstruction inside the red line.

Beirut’s Solidere project (l-r): aerial with project area perimeter in red, map of project area, aerial of wartime destruction.

Relinquishing a highly contested urban territory to the vagaries of market forces was
unprecedented. The ultimate success of Beirut’s experiment has yet to be determined. For
certain, Solidere is an interesting hybrid of tradition and innovation. Drawing upon Beirut’s
reputation as the entrepreneurial and secular capital of the Middle East, the investment-driven
model for postwar reconstruction is in close keeping with the character of the city and appears
aggressively pragmatic. Opportunity and risk are distributed across a wide, international
spectrum of investors and over a lengthy implementation timetable generated by a
comprehensive preliminary plan. Largely bypassing local favorites and rivals, all major
architectural design commissions were tied to international competitions intended to attract
unimpeachable professional talent and raise the profile of the project as a whole with celebrity
designers.
By tying the process the physical recovery to profit motives and the unit value of widely held
stock, incentives were distributed in a manner that minimized local political influences. For
exactly the same reason, responsiveness to the concerns and expectations of local residents was
dramatically reduced. While the central business district received the lion’s share of investment
professional attention, the remainder of Beirut--the vast majority of the city and its residents-remained relatively stagnant. Determined to maximize return on investment for Solidere
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shareholders, in house urban planners, architects and conservators designed a utopist enclave
tailored primarily to the expectations of an international corporate elite.

Beirut rebuilt (l-r): apartments in Solidere project area before reconstruction, and after, structures outside project area await repairs.

Critics of the project grew bolder and more organized throughout the late 1990’s, lamenting the
replacement of the Green Line separating ethnic factions with Solidere’s red line separating
economic classes. Advocates cited the trickle-down economic benefits of concentrated
institutional investment and asserted that the complex incentives propelling private investment
allowed revitalization to proceed at a fraction of the time and cost that would have been required
if the job had been left to Lebanon’s crippled public institutions.
A decade after its first stock offering on the open market, Solidere’s achievements from the
standpoint of physical rehabilitation in the central business district are nothing short of
astonishing. New construction proceeded a rapid rate and in accordance with exceedingly high
standards for design and infrastructure. The technical dimensions of project planning and
coordination have largely been impeccable, demonstrated by the consistently high quality of new
buildings and public spaces. The built environment professionals responsible for this work
emphasize that they have created an economically viable downtown to lead the economic
revitalization of Beirut as a whole, upon which the economic fortunes of the country largely rest.
They claim to have reconstructed it a mult- ethnic social arena physically and symbolically
reconnecting pieces of the city that were severed during the course of inter ethnic hostilities.
Though downtown Beirut has now been transformed into an enclave for corporate tenants, its
engineers promise that substantial benefits will be spun off to all Beirutis once the rehabilitation
project is completed and full tenancy has been achieved.
When judged according to strictly cosmetic and economic criteria, and simultaneously limiting
our view to the city’s historic core, Solidere’s daring open heart surgery in Beirut has been
successful. No hint of infection is visible within the largely rebuilt downtown that sparkles with
rehabilitated nostalgia and an undeniably youthful vigor. A handful of historic landmark
buildings have been meticulously preserved along with the permanent exposure of an
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archaeological site possibly dating to the Phoenician period. Beirut’s central business district
presents the image of a fully recovered financial capital ready to do business in the international
arena. There is little doubt that some of its well-heeled tenants are poised to guide the city
towards a prosperous future.
But Solidere’s critics are quick to point out that these tenants bear little resemblance to the diverse
array of occupants living and working in the downtown area prior to the war:
I’m not taken by the great effort for physical beauty and the renovation of Allenby
street. I don’t accept the city without its people. There were 130,000 people living there
from all confessions and all classes of society, which is equally important: from
craftsmen to very rich professionals. It was a bulging society.54
Other critics believe that excessive demolition accompanied Solidere’s renewal scheme in order
to meet density and revenue benchmarks, underscoring the tension built into “the logic of
Solidere” between historic preservation and real estate development on the open market:
The more they destroy, the more they make a profit. The more they throw people out,
the more they make profit.55
Solidere’s leadership contends that they have done Beirut a favor by improving a downtown area
that was, in the aftermath of the war, “…a slum, a destroyed area with no infrastructure”.56
Solidere’s critics meanwhile complained about the unnecessary demolition of historic fabric that
did not meet the high density requirements specified by Solidere as master plan, and yet others
have suggested that postwar reconstruction following a national crisis of such vast proportions
should never have been chained to profit motive.
It was inevitable that such an unorthodox and focused rehabilitation strategy would leave many
observers dissatisfied, especially since it was undertaken in the absence of political and social
consensus in Lebanon as a whole. Is not at all clear that what Solidere’s urban revitalization
project lacks in terms of social inclusion and relevance can be compensated for in terms of
architectural allure and capital investment--both of which are likely to benefit well-heeled
stockholders long before average Beirutis—who continue to bear the brunt of partition’s negative
impacts—receive their share.
In no other case examined here was comprehensive physical reconstruction initiated so
decisively, implemented so quickly or accomplished according to such high technical standards.
In Beirut, the efficiency of this rapid and highly organized process can be attributed to the virtues
of market driven real-estate development and the willingness of Beirut’s municipal government
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to give up control over such a prominent and vital project. The near total divestment of Lebanese
policymakers and built environment professionals from the reconstruction process in the
downtown area it is striking. Beirut is also distinguished for projecting a postwar image of itself
so out of keeping with prewar realities. Though none questions the fact that Solidere has adapted
the heart of the city, opinions vary regarding whether it was made stronger or weaker in the
aftermath of reconstructive surgery:
[Solidere’s planners] have taken the heart of the capital, pushed the people out of it and
forced them to lose ownership of the land...they ended up by dividing the city more
than ever.57
Though reconstruction efforts undertaken in Beirut’s historic core have met many of their
prescribed objectives, those objectives did not include many of the most glaring, important, and
difficult challenges facing the city’s many desperate and traumatized residents. Accordingly, the
Beirut example illustrates vividly both the virtues and shortcomings of post-war reconstruction
guided by a free market.

Mostar
About 5,000 residents of Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, died a result of interethnic hostilities
between 1992 and 1995, including combatants and non-combatants. During the same period, as
many as 40,000 prewar residents left the city altogether in order to avoid the violence, about
10,000 male residents were forcibly detained in local prisoner camps and more than 30,000
remained in the city but were compelled to leave their homes. In eastern Mostar between 1993
and 1995, supplies of food, heating fuels and medicine were consistently low and irregular,
leading to a predicable set of health problems. Citizens collecting drinking water along the
eastern bank of the river risked exposure to sniper fire from the surrounding hills, which also
threatened pedestrians crossing bridges or traversing open spaces on essential errands. Though
the number of residents physically injured or severely traumatized by the violence is not known,
it can be assumed that few Mostarian families emerged from the war with all its members alive,
unscathed and residing in their pre-war homes.
The costs of violence and separation between rival ethnic groups in Mostar are more neatly
calculated in material terms. The physical destruction or inaccessibility of many schools, offices,
homes, factories, and public infrastructure in Mostar during the course of hostilities left its
citizens in the eastern sector struggling for bare survival and economic life in the western sector
dominated by illicit trade. Thousands of immigrants forced to abandon surrounding villages
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arrived in the city, occupying empty apartments and straining the already overburdened
infrastructure. As a regional capital and one of Bosnia’s major manufacturing cities, Mostar was
harshly affected by general lapses in national productivity during the war. Economic growth
rates were halved with the outbreak of inter-ethnic hostilities, dipping towards -27% by the end
of 1993, while the adjusted gross domestic product fell precipitously from $13.1 billion in 1990 to
$6.2 billion in 1993. Theft, expulsion, and bombardment generated massive property losses.
Hundreds of Bosniak families from western Mostar were obliged to abandon their homes with
what they could carry, or less, leaving the bulk of their possession behind for looters or black
market profiteers.
Mostar’s residents relied almost exclusively on foreign donations and expertise to jump-start the
process of post-conflict recovery. As in Belfast, concepts of evenhandedness, balance, and
neutrality remained inapplicable for years following the end of hostilities. Because municipal
authorities on both sides of the city generally refused to cooperate, political consensus long
remained an imaginary concept feebly maintained for public-relations purposes.

Mostar after bombardment (l-r): aerial of historic core, Old Bridge falling, front line graffito, front line apartments still in ruin.

The burden of post-war revitalization lay most heavily on eastern Mostar, where grossly
disproportionate physical and psychological punishment had been meted out to Muslim
residents living within the historic Ottoman core centered on the Old Bridge. Bifurcated since
thencity’s physical division in 1992, the two halves of Mostar functioned as separate, autonomous
and redundant cities throughout the first decade of post-conflict rehabilitation.
Physical reconstruction activities would have proceeded in a similarly bifurcated manner if
municipal authorities in the eastern sector had possessed the human and material resources
required to complete such an undertaking alone, but they did not. This fact forced the city to
solicit foreign support and led to a dilemma. On one hand, lingering resentments between rival
ethnic communities made even superficial acts of cooperation across the city’s ethnic boundary
very unlikely. These odds grew worse in relation to the physical revitalization agenda, since the
majority of buildings in urgent need of attention were on the eastern side of the city. On the
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other hand, external funding agencies and foreign experts insisted that all projects relying on
foreign subsidy should be undertaken in a balanced manner and with shared responsibilities.
Foreign implementation agencies obliged to demonstrate impartiality in their local political
relationships found it difficult to accept the fact that relatively strict functional and
administrative divisions persisted long after the regional conflict was ended by the Dayton
Accords. Pleased by the prospect of contributing to a lasting peace, foreign donors expected their
contributions to simultaneously provide material support for physical rehabilitation and catalyze
vital processes of social and political reconciliation in Mostar.
Accordingly, almost every foreign agency to invest in the city’s physical reconstruction
conditioned its involvement on the demonstration of inter-ethnic cooperation within the
municipal government. Local protocols were developed to provide these assurances to foreign
donor agencies, and their purses gradually opened as Mostar’s rival politicians learned to shake
hands and assert their commitment to partnership with increasing persuasiveness. Support
materialized from quasi-governmental and nonprofit organizations like the European Union,
UNESCO, War Child, the Aga Khan Trust for Culture, the World monuments Fund, The World
Bank, and others. Encouraged by the ease of this initial progress, many of these agencies went on
to focus their efforts on a highly emblematic and historic architectural landmarks located within
the Ottoman core. Though a number of rehabilitation projects undertaken in the historic core
addressed structures of secondary historical importance and primary and functional value--such
as schools, libraries, banks and office buildings--the majority of foreign investments were poured
into highly emblematic and monumental structures. The natural centerpiece for these efforts was
the facsimile reconstruction of the Old Bridge, completed in the early part of 2004 and formally
dedicated in July of that year.
Among Muslim residents of eastern Mostar these efforts were initially greeted with enthusiasm
and approval. As economic reforms failed to materialize in the wake of more symbolic projects,
dissatisfaction became discernable at the local level.. Repair of emblematic historic sites
dominated postwar rehabilitation efforts because professionals were hoping to kill two birds
with one stone: repair physical damage and at the same time provide encouragement for
beleaguered residents of the city by replacing structures that had been most inspiring prior to the
outbreak of hostilities.
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Mostar during reconstruction (l-r): focus on historic core, new Old Bridge, local architect at the Sevri Hadji Hasan Mosque.

This was a motivational rather than a functional revitalization strategy, and it relied heavily on
the idea the physical projects can have edifying social consequences. The product of this strategy
in Mostar was a kind of virtual rather than actual recovery.
In the minds and imaginations of foreign interveners, it is widely believed that a facsimile
reconstruction of the fallen Old Bridge will heal social wounds by physically reuniting former
antagonists and literally stitching together a divided city: Croatians on the western side and
Bosniaks on the eastern side. Unfortunately, few local citizens will find much solace in the
realization of this project, underwritten with the special World Bank loan and monitored by
Unesco, since the front line, and the true fault line separating Muslim and Catholic communities,
was the Austro-Hungarian Bulevar Narodne Revolucije lying 200 yards west of and parallel to the
Neretva River. Fixation on the Old Bridge as an emblem of recovery is certainly tempting, but
relatively unimportant in relation to the process of long-term social reconciliation in Mostar.
Some Mostarians resent projects that dwell on landmark structures damaged during periods of
conflict, preferring a more pragmatic approach to reconstruction:
Not until some firms or some factories are rebuilt where those people could work will
we need the Old City…if only the eyes are full and the pockets empty, then there is
nothing.58
Without significant revenue or local capacity to undertake large-scale urban renewal projects,
reconstruction officials in Mostar were left with few appealing options in the aftermath of the
war. Their decision to embrace foreign contributions from private non-governmental
organizations resulted in high-profile physical reconstruction projects detached from vital social
development agendas. This type of compromise is typical for divided cities beholden to an array
of uncoordinated private donors because their funds often come with an inadequate
understanding of the needs of urban residents and multiple incentives to invest in landmark
structures. Though large flows of free foreign capital entered the city, lack of coordination and
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control over how it was spent resulted in a reconstruction process marred by poor integration,
superficiality, and minimal capacity upgrade.

Effectiveness of Reconstruction in Relation to Conflict Type
Though most post-war cities bear many outward similarities at close of hostilities, the long-term
success of post-war reconstruction efforts depends on how well they relate to the type of conflict
experienced by local residents. A cursory examination of selected reconstruction activities in
post-war Warsaw (1945-1970) and Belfast (1968-present) demonstrates two important ways that
the nature of a war—its causes, combatants, and mechanisms—influences the course of
reconstruction.

Warsaw
World War II took an especially harsh toll on Warsaw, home to a large Jewish population and
scene of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising between April 19 and May 16, 1943. This desperate
counter-offensive, ultimately crushed, was followed by the general Warsaw Uprising initiated on
Aug. 1, 1944 by the underground Polish Home Army for the liberation of the city from Nazi
control. In the end, German military command demolished the Jewish neighborhoods and much
of the remainder of the city in response to these acts of resistance, leaving behind and more than
650,000 Polish dead and about 84% of the pre-war urban fabric in ruins. Hundred of thousands of
other Warsavians were deported to concentration camps elsewhere in Poland before perishing.

By 1945, the capital had been transformed into a moonscape. The war had inflicted more than
$45 billion in material losses alone. When US General Dwight Eisenhower visited Warsaw
immediately after the war he was moved to comment, “I have seen many towns destroyed, but
nowhere have I been faced with such destruction.”59

Polish officials made an early decision to reconstruct the Old Town as a pre-war facsimile; in fact,
many of their plans called for a return to the nineteenth century appearance of the historic core.
Throughout the German siege, Warsaw’s ‘soldier-architects’ protected historic documentation
and designed plans for reconstruction even while the buildings were collapsing around them.
The power and vitality of the city was proven after the war when thousands of residents returned
from the countryside to an urban landscape literally reduced to rubble. Their collective efforts,
subsidized by intermittent funding from Poland’s new masters in Moscow, eventually restored
the original appearance of inner Warsaw through a program of arduous research and
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reconstruction. Because they exploited local resources in a sensitive and energetic manner, the
engineers of post-war reconstruction efforts in Warsaw still serve as a model for larger projects.

Warsaw after bombardment (l-r): aerial of historic core circa 1945, central grid obliterated, Jewish ghetto fully demolished.

Why was this return to the urban prototype so essential? In 1946 a writer for The Warsaw
Escarpment commented:
If the Warsaw community is to be reborn, if its core is to be constituted by former
Warsawians, then they have to be given back their old rebuilt Warsaw to some extent,
so that they can see in it the same city, though considerably altered, and not a different
town on the same spot. One must take into consideration the fact that individual
attachment to old forms is a factor of social unity.
For these reasons, the more functional goals of urban renewal frequently competed with the
public’s desire for restitution of cherished scales, monuments, and details. Professionals in charge
of recovery had to balance these disparate agendas. Warsaw planners struck a rather rigid
bargain; permission to replicate the historic urban core was effectively traded for the
simultaneous development of the outlying industrial districts according to Russian economic
models that completely reconfigured the functional zones of the city with minimal concession to
preexisting patterns.

Warsaw after reconstruction (l-r): restored historic core aerial, from market square, and drab post-war industrial belt.

The historic quarter was restored at the expense of the other sections of the city—dismissed by
Warsaw’s new Communist overseers as worthless monuments to bourgeois values—which were
demolished in advance of large projects tied to the newly centralized Socialist economy. The
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values of a reconstruction patron are inevitably reflected in the character of post-war
reconstruction.

The strength and popularity of the movement to restore the devastated historic core of Warsaw,
even at the expense of highly functional nineteenth century fabric outside the city center, may be
linked to the nature of the conflict that wrought destruction in the first place. The lines of the
conflict were very clear-cut, and the Allied victory was unambiguous. Accordingly, the
designation of winner and losers in the aftermath was not subject to question; despite spoiling
the city and killing most of its inhabitants, the residents of Warsaw emerged from their ordeal
victorious. The nihilistic campaign of their enemies had failed and the reconstruction effort
would be an emblem of full recuperation—both physical and psychological. The rebuilding of
the historic core, undertaken with the labor of thousands of ordinary citizens, was a kind of
group therapy in response to the horrors of the war and the moral victory enjoyed by the
Germans’ former enemies.

Warsaw provides a clear demonstration of the fact that reconstruction activities providing shortterm psychological benefits to local residents do not necessarily generate desirable long-term
results.

Belfast
For Belfast “The Troubles” began in earnest around 1968 with the Bombay Street riots. Ethnic
rivalry continues to provoke violence between Protestants and Catholics and disturb almost
every aspect of life in Northern Ireland is one of the most longstanding conflicts of its kind
anywhere in the world. For centuries, Belfast has suffered the brunt of these institutionalized
abuses and deprivations. Of approximately 3600 violent deaths directly associated with sectarian
conflict in Northern Ireland between 1969and 1998, about 1220--almost exactly one third--took
the lives of Belfast residents, the majority of which lived in the traditional working-class sectors
of the city in the north and west. Most studies support the assumption that physical injuries
outnumbered deaths in Northern Ireland during this period about 10 to one, and naturally occur
according to the same cycles in with the same concentrations. These estimates suggest that about
13,300 residents of Belfast suffered injury or death as a direct result of sectarian violence, about
4.1% of the city's total population in 1991.
Authors of a study that measured the direct physical impacts of sectarian violence concluded that
“the combination of deaths and injuries represents the primary human cost of the Troubles
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although these do not encompass the trauma of grief, imprisonment and intimidation.” 60 While
trauma cannot be measured directly, several indicators were selected for quantitative survey:
incidence of post-traumatic stress disorders, prevalence of violent nightmares, involuntary recall
violent episodes experience directly or indirectly, and pervasive feelings of guilt related to
surviving events that claimed the lives to live lives of others. The incidence of all these
psychological symptoms was greatest in areas of high intensity, already strongly correlated to
interface areas of working-class north and west Belfast.
Other psychological impacts of an even less diagnosable major can be assumed to conform to the
same general patterns, including an overarching sense of helplessness, xenophobia,
claustrophobia and fatalism. Many residents of Belfast have a growing fear of leaving the
enclave of which they were a member, and often felt trapped in a conference of House or
neighborhood due to the inescapable fear that terrible things would happen if they ventured too
far away from these relatively safe havens. Because workplaces too were frequently segregated
during the period of worst violence, they did not always offer solace from the monotony of life
within sectarian enclaves.
One urban planner laments the absence of built environment professionals from major decisions
related to the physical partition of Belfast, where he and his colleagues contributed little to the
problem of ethnic partition despite ample time and opportunity to design comprehensive
strategies:
So [this is] what has defeated me all the way along the line…I can’t understand how policymaking
and planning have stepped aside from all this…how all the policy statements have ignored the
conflict.61
In Belfast, ethnically balanced urban plans are frequently derailed because urban planners are
beholden to policy makers deeply invested in sectarian issues and tied directly to constituents in
need of short-term security guarantees.

Belfast during The Troubles (l-r): Catholic children burned out, fortified interface zones, blighted housing with sectarian markings.
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Under such circumstances, professional involvement with the problems of divided cities brings
complicity with policies that may often run afoul of academic training or individual conscience.
Confronted by a double imperative--immediate threats and directives from municipal
authorities—local experts are left with few alternatives. Those that remain active are frequently
forced to rationalize their actions as the lesser of several evils within an inherently dysfunctional
municipal system.

Belfast with peacelines (l-r): around housing, blocking sensitive traffic arteries, extended against projectiles.

Beleaguered Catholics in Northern Ireland have long maintained dual status as a statistical
majority in Ireland with firm cultural ties to a friendly government in Dublin while remaining a
politically disenfranchised minority in Northern Ireland. Most vulnerable are those residents
impacted directly by fluctuating economic conditions, making clear the class-based component of
many divided city scenarios:
There is a greater degree of conflict between the two ethnic groups in the working class
context…generated by situations of scarcity and competition particularly in housing and jobs.62
Equilibrium under conditions of relative deprivation between competing ethnic groups in the
urban domain tends to stabilize a discriminatory environment without a stabilized group
hierarchy. This environment acts as an incubator for resentment and violence among ethnically
diverse groups.
The conflict in Belfast began in 1968 and is ongoing. Under more normal conditions, the fear and
violence shaping daily life in Belfast would lead to some form of resolution in light of the
insupportable tensions they create. When external circumstance, third‐party incentives, and
legacies of discrimination disallow both cooperation and capitulation as pragmatic outlets for
these tensions, new formal and informal systems are created to resolve it. Because both groups
typically view themselves as a beleaguered minority, both feel entitled to take extraordinary
measures in order to secure their sense of collective well‐being and to compensate for disparity of
needs, power, opportunity, and access to important resources. As these compensatory systems
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grow in sophistication and effectiveness, they contribute to a self‐fulfilling prophecy of emnity
while faith in conventional mechanisms of public justice and allocation erodes.

The Kobe Control
The Kobe earthquake of 1995 generated a physical and humanitarian disaster very similar to
several other case studies examined in this paper. From the perspective of survivors who lost
friends, family members, homes, jobs, or health, the fact that their suffering was generated by an
earthquake rather than war is immaterial. The speed and effectiveness with which these
concerns were addressed by reconstruction authorities, on the other hand, was of utmost
relevance. The speed, nature and quality of reconstruction efforts generally distinguish the
aftermath of natural disaster from post-war rehabilitation. This is especially true when they are
undertaken by a wealthy, well-organized country. For this reason, a brief glance at the aftermath
of Kobe’s earthquake will help to identify some of the special challenges inherent to postwar
reconstruction along with several concerns bound up with reconstruction that the Kobe example
shares with the case studies presented above.

At dawn on January 17, 1995, the Kobe suffered extensive damage as a result of the Great
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the strongest direct-hit earthquake Japan has suffered since the end
of World War II. This episode lasted about twenty seconds and measured 7.2 on the Richter
scale; it resulted in the death of approximately 6,336 urban residents, injured approximately
25,000, rendered about 310,000 homeless, left about one million households without water, 40,000
without electricity, and 850,000 without natural gas, destroyed 46,000 buildings and suspended
operations at the Port, which had accommodated approximately 30% of Japan's container cargo.
Material damages were estimated at $99.3 billion, half the normal yearly economic output of the
city. This was the second major disaster faced by Kobe’s residents in less than 50 years.63

Kobe (l-r): devastated by 1945 Allied bombing, housing ruined by 1995 earthquake, collapsed highway, fires that followed.

The difference between the two disasters is illustrated well by the expectations of Kobe residents
following the earthquake. An hour after the great tremor struck, one observer was startled to see
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men in his neighborhood, where many of the one-family houses were totally destroyed, heading
for work. “They were looking at their watches and wondering why the bus hadn’t arrived on
time,” he noted.64 Though their expectations were unmet, the anecdote underscores the notion
that reconstruction following natural disaster is expected to benefit from the normal capacities of
an otherwise healthy society while recovery following war is not. It can be assumed that few
were consulting their watches after the bombing raids of 1945.

Response to natural disaster and man-made disaster can be distinguished by the strength and
reliability of institutional support systems. The victims of the Kobe earthquake benefited from
swift assistance provided by the Japanese government, its national volunteer networks, and the
material stockpiles in nearby cities like Tokyo. Because the disaster occurred in a relatively
wealthy and well organized country, responses to human and material losses were relatively
organized and adequately funded. A few of Kobe’s reconstruction milestones are listed below in
order to illustrate the behavior of a healthy response network to an isolated set of traumas:

January 1995: The national government calls for a two-month moratorium on reconstruction
in order to facilitate research, planning, and public consultation.
January 31, 1995: citywide phone service restored.
March 28, 1995: Port of Kobe Reconstruction Committee released initial progress report.
March 30, 1995: all subways functioning.
April 1, 1995: Restoration Fund established, providing 600 billion yen for socioeconomic
rehabilitation aid to elderly earthquake victims, loans, and interest subsidies.
April 11, 1995: citywide gas service restored.
April 17, 1995: citywide water service restored.
May 1, 1995: citywide sewage service restored.
June 20, 1995: train service on the Hankyu and Hanshin lines restored.
June 30, 1995: Kobe City Reconstruction Plan presented for public discussion by the Kobe
City Reconstruction Plan Council
July 7, 1995: Emergency Three-Year Plan for Housing Reconstruction issued, granting the
provision of 82,000 housing units by public and private sectors.
July 24, 1995: Kobe Housing Restoration Plan issued, raising the number of public housing
units by 10,000 to 26,100 and calling for special rent reductions
July 30, 1995: Hyogo Phoenix Plan proposed: a $170 billion undertaking for a "New Eastern
City", international research institutes and 10,000 units of modern housing.
42

Volume 6

Center for Macro Projects and Diplomacy Working Paper Series

Spring 2005

April 1, 1996: Post-Quake Citizen Support Services Head Office established, coordinating the
socioeconomic rehabilitation efforts of earthquake victims
May 9, 1996: Port of Kobe Reconstruction Promotion Council established.
June 5, 1996: Citizens' Housing Restoration Council established, facilitating socioeconomic
rehabilitation and providing a venue for discussion of reconstruction measures
May 15, 1998: Socioeconomic Rehabilitation Aid For Victims Law enacted, providing cash
payments for earthquake victims depending on income and age
August 10, 1998: Permanent Housing Transition Program established, categorizing eligible and
non-eligible residents and providing assistance under existing aid systems.
January 7, 2000: Review and Examination of Socioeconomic Rehabilitation, with public
presentation and discussion.

The high levels of planning, coordination, and program integration guiding this sequence of
events are characteristic of Japanese government and were found in none of the post-war
reconstruction case studies summarized above. The major priorities guiding reconstruction,
along with their relative importance in the overall effort, are neatly summarized below in a chart
drafted by authorities responsible for Kobe’s successful recovery:

These well-defined, ranked priorities go further to distinguish the strategy adopted by
reconstruction officials in Kobe due to its highly organized, transparent, and conscientious
approach.
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Kobe during reconstruction (l-r): homeless shelter, soup kitchen, temporary housing erected, then dismantled according to schedule.

The five year effort was far from perfect. Numerous mistakes, omissions, and complaints
emerged from a review of current literature regarding the aftermath of the Kobe earthquake.
Strict protocols for research, planning, and evaluation did not suit the needs of all residents.
Tired of waiting for city leaders to finish plans for an elaborate reconstruction, hundreds of Kobe
residents took matters into their own hands, rebuilding without official permits only to see their
homes later torn down for violating retroactive zoning laws drafted later. From an economic
perspective, the recovery process in Kobe was constrained by pre-earthquake trends; Kobe's
importance as a regional cargo hub for East Asia had also been declining before last January as a
result of competition from more modern terminals in Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan's
Kaohsiung and the South Korean port of Pusan. One planning official for the local Earthquake

Reconstruction Bureau observed that “Kobe was already struggling when the quake hit. The
damage to the economy was much more severe as a result, making it that much harder for us to
recover.”65

On the political front, many of Kobe’s residents were frustrated and disappointed by what they
perceived as a sluggish response from national authorities. It was widely reported that while
Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama pledged that his government would “waste no time in
taking every necessary fiscal and financial measure”, in actuality he had learned of the disaster as
much as two hours after it struck. Far from praising the efficiency of the official response, a Keio
University economics professor who wrote a book about the crisis concluded that “it
demonstrated the failure of Japanese government policy to keep up with environmental changes
and challenges. We learned that we had no system for civil security. We have a security system
for international crises, but for defense of people against natural hazards, it simply was not
there.” Some critics have gone even further to argue that the deepening social crisis experienced
in Japan during the mid-1990s--rising debt, scandals among powerful and once-lionized
bureaucrats, and deep alienation among young people--began with “the government’s bungled
response to Kobe.”66
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Still, its relatively thoughtful and comprehensive recovery programs distinguish post-earthquake
Kobe from the majority of comparable post-conflict revitalization efforts. Unlike Mostar and
Beirut, the approach to urban revitalization was comprehensive and engaged all major sectors of
the social and physical environment affected. Unlike Warsaw and Coventry, the process of
reconstruction was distorted by neither excessive sentimentality nor disregard for history.
Unlike Dubrovnik and Belfast, the context for rebuilding was characterized by healthy
bureaucracy, clear lines of institutional hierarchy, and a well-defined constituencies. In general,
the progress of Kobe’s post-disaster programs was unhindered by ambiguity; all the capacities of
the country as a whole could be rapidly brought to bear on the aftermath of disaster.

The challenge and hallmark of post-conflict recovery is the need to negotiate endless ambiguities
and systemic deficiencies. Those internal antagonisms and institutional weaknesses that led to
the outbreak of hostilities influence post-war activities with an intensity equal to, or sometimes
greater than, the pre-war period. This is the context in which improved recovery strategies must
be scrutinized and developed, lacking much of the clarity and efficiency observed in Kobe.

Summary: Success Factors for Post-War Reconstruction
Successful post-war reconstruction can be both orderly and predictable.67 Still, it is difficult to
measure and transferable strategies are few.
There is no known blueprint for effective foreign intervention, though many pitfalls have been
identified in the professional literature. Many capable and conscientious practitioners simply
avoid the topic altogether. Others intervene without the social and anthropological data needed
to identify the root problem and local coping mechanisms accurately.68 “Despite its doubtless
positive influences, international assistance nonetheless has developed a stigma of general
failure.”69
Foreign assistance is fraught with risks, limitations, and liabilities and the cost of failure is high.
The wrong kind of aid inhibits local recovery processes, monopolizes local professional capacity,
creates dependence, trumps more appropriate local solutions, alienates and humiliates local
authorities, affirms a sense of helplessness, institutionalizes paternalistic agency-victim
relationships, and fosters traditional rivalries and inspire envy.70 It can constitute a secondary
disaster.71
Both war and the human trauma that follows are symptoms of a larger illness. Some wars are
undeclared, and some impacts are impossible to measure with certainty. “Many policy makers
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and field practitioners are reluctant to delves into the more controversial and ambiguous areas
such as psychological trauma, conflict mitigation and even human rights protection. Unlike the
conventional sectors of water, sanitation, health, shelter, and food relief, these are less
quantifiable and their success may not be readily apparent.” 72 Effective responses acknowledge
all these components, reflect local dynamics and root causes, and deliver resources to points of
need.
Identification of causes, consequences, and objectives requires a firm understanding of chronic
stresses, patterns of episodic violence, and baseline conditions before cataclysm. A recovery
scheme is working well when it addresses more than the emergency phase and is marked by
decreasing levels of external manpower, funding, and guidance over time.
Historically, strong reconstruction projects utilized appropriate technologies, spend a majority of
project funds within the project area, and focus their activities in a particular area or sector that
corresponds to a data-driven interpretation of the root causes of conflict. These projects choose
an intervention strategy that reflects long-term, systematic recovery needs and the resources
available through other channels. The kind of decision making required to design such an
intervention is impossible without active communication between relevant research institutions,
proper application of key research findings, and balanced partnerships with local counterpart
agencies.

This working paper highlighted the following issues related to potential effectiveness of post-war
reconstruction programs implemented by foreign actors:

a. Disaster, whether natural or man-made, is a process “defined on the basis of its
human consequences, not on the phenomenon that caused it” and should be
measured by relief agencies in terms of psychological, physical, and economic
disruption. (p. 5)

b. The root causes of disaster shape effective rehabilitation such that “the ongoing forces
that produced the characteristics of the pre-disaster city re-emerge as the primary
determinants of the city of the future.” Effective responses to conflict are part of
ongoing social development, not merely a program for the provision of material aid.
(p. 7-8)
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c. Post-war reconstruction is often fraught with tension between popular nostalgia and
professional ambition. Function-oriented goals of urban renewal frequently compete
with the public’s desire for restitution of cherished scales, monuments, and details.
(p. 13)

d. Foreign agencies often underestimate the value of local resources and view their
relationship with the local community in terms of victims and providers, amateurs
and experts, or passive and active participants. This polarity can generate distrust and
discourage public participation, greatly decreasing the potency of relief efforts. (p. 14)

e. Available methods and technologies for information transfer are rarely exploited
though they enable local recovery officials to strategize more efficiently and locate
sources of support on a continuous basis. Often information is more valuable than
money. (p. 18)

f. Cursory examination of selected reconstruction activities in post-war Coventry and
Dubrovnik shows that successful short-term responses to post-war recovery needs do
not always translate into successful long-term development strategies. (p. 20ff)

g. Cursory examination of selected reconstruction activities in post-war Beirut and
Mostar shows that the effectiveness of post-war reconstruction depends on the
coordinating agent’s relationship to the root causes of conflict and the affected
community. (p. 26ff)

h. Cursory examination of selected reconstruction activities in post-war Warsaw and
Belfast shows that most post-war cities appear similar at close of hostilities, successful
post-war reconstruction strategies vary according to the nature of the conflict. (p. 32ff)

i. The speed, nature and quality of reconstruction distinguish natural disaster recover
from post-war rehabilitation. More post-war reconstruction programs would
resemble Kobe’s recovery if pre-war constraints did not carry over into the post-war
period. (p. 37ff)

The uncoordinated and arbitrary character of most conventional interventions makes further
study and discussion valuable. It is hoped that the upcoming conference hosted by the CMPD
will take up the challenge of articulating and testing improved models for successful
intervention.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Key Practitioners and Scholars
Pamela Aall, Director, Education Program at the United States Institute for Peace. Special interest
in education and training on conflict and peacemaking, conflict management and resolution, the
role of NGOs in conflict and conflict management, and track-two diplomacy.
Morton Abramowitz, Senior Fellow, The Century Foundation; former Assistant Secretary of State
for Intelligence and Research; President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1991–97).
Special interest in U.S. foreign policy, national security, the Balkans, Turkey.
Gareth Evans, President & CEO, International Crisis Group, a multinational non-governmental
organization working through field-based analysis and high-level policy advocacy, to prevent
and resolve deadly conflict. One of Australia's longest serving Foreign Ministers, he is best
known internationally for his role in helping to develop the UN peace plan for Cambodia.
Angus Gavin, Senior Advisor to the Chairman, Solidere, responsible for the Master Plan for Beirut’s
Central District, special interest in the development of large urban reclamation schemes, coauthor of Beirut Reborn: The Restoration and Development of the Central District, 1996.
Monty Marshall, Senior Research Associate, Center for International Development and Conflict
Management at the University of Maryland, Director of the Center for Systemic Peace, a not-forprofit social science research enterprise focusing on global systems analysis and, especially, the
problem of political violence within the complex societal-system development processes.
Kimberly Maynard, President, The Cuny Center, special interest in peacebuilding strategies in
humanitarian emergencies, conflict assessment and management, post conflict recovery and
reconstruction, locally-driven approaches to conflict recovery, design of improved operational
and coordination mechanisms, and evaluation of post-conflict recovery efforts.
Amir Pasic, Founder and Director, Mostar 2004 post-war planning workshops, Project Manager for
Mostar field project for Aga Khan Trust for Culture and World Monuments Fund.
Shonali Sardesai, Research Associate for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment, Conflict Prevention
and Reconstruction Unit of the World Bank, provides conflict analysis aimed at optimizing
project design in conflict-affected countries,; administers the Post-Conflict Fund to support
planning, piloting and analysis of ground-breaking approaches to the transition from conflict.
Mona Serageldin, Adjunct Professor of Urban Planning and Associate Director of The Center for
Urban Development Studies at Harvard, special interest in capacity building through training
and technical assistance, urban strategies for economic development, strategic planning,
public/private partnerships and community-based approaches to housing and economic
development.
Matthias Stiefel, Executive Director, War-torn Societies Project, designed to assist the
international community and national and local actors to better understand and respond to the
complex challenge of rebuilding war-torn societies in post-conflict situations.
Per Egil Wam, Social Scientist, Post-Conflict Unit, World Bank, special interest in conflict analysis,
conflict prevention, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, post-conflict
reconstruction.
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Appendix 2: Hypothetical Conference Agenda
Session

Topic

Objectives

1

Better theoretical approaches to post-war Identify key constraints, faulty
assumptions, obsolete models &
reconstruction: engaging social
innovative proposals
development agenda

2

Better practical approaches to post-war
reconstruction: measuring impacts in
human terms

Identify transferable components of
effective implementation strategies

3

Best and worst models: case study
comparison of Beirut, Mostar, Kabul,
Coventry, and Dili

Close examination of real projects that
exemplify key opportunities and pitfalls

4

Designing the perfect reconstruction
program: phases, participants,
resources, outcomes

Characterize the ideal reconstruction
program when envisioned without
constraints

5

Candidate projects for future
implementation: identification,
elaboration, and collaboration

Reach consensus on three candidate
reconstruction schemes to be developed for
possible implementation
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